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Introduction 
When we teach undergraduates, we naturally focus on the economic way of thinking as 
an analytical framework, guiding students in using a set of principles to understand economic 
phenomena. However, there is also a set of meta-principles at play that often do not receive 
enough attention. How economic principles are used (and misused) outside the classroom, how 
they inform debates, and how students can confidently take their own stand in these debates are 
arguably as important as the principles themselves. An economics class presents an excellent 
opportunity to instruct students more generally in thinking carefully and expressing ideas. 
While it is typical for an introductory textbook to discuss the types of controversies 
involving economics that arise in the public sphere, this discussion tends to be cursory and often 
gives the impression (or even states directly) that there is a sharp dichotomy between subjective 
and objective issues, that there are value-laden applications of economics but that the scientific 
conclusions of economics are not open to debate. Even if a textbook, or an instructor, does not 
intend to leave that impression, it is useful to discuss pointedly what it means for economics to 
be regarded as a science and whether and to what extent the conclusions of economics can be 
considered objective. 
 
What is debatable? 
“Is everything in economics debatable?” 
A student in a principles class put this question to me some years ago. Unable to answer 
either yes or no without a great deal of qualification, I developed a discussion focusing on what it 
means for a topic to be “debatable.” One component of this discussion is what we consider to be 
objective truth. Objective is often defined as free from the influence of personal feelings or 
values: e.g., one would like a jury to render an objective verdict, based only on the facts of the 
case. In a philosophical sense, objective refers to a reality that is independent of any one person’s 
perception of it: an objective truth belongs to the object of thought rather than to the person 
having the thought. One might then say that objective conclusions are those that are derived 
logically from objective truths. On the other hand, a logical or mathematical argument always 
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relies on some set of axioms upon which different people may or may not agree, and furthermore 
there is no way to prove that any given perception of reality is trustworthy, or common to all of 
those perceiving it. We are then left with the notion that objective truths may exist, but we can 
have no certainty about anything beyond cogito ergo sum. And so there is arguably no true 
objectivity in any human endeavor; but if we can agree on observed reality and the rules of logic, 
we can come close enough that it isn’t worth quibbling about. (Even so, I usually avoid the word 
objective in class, preferring alternatives like concrete. For example, market value is concrete, 
whereas any other notion of value is likely to be quite subjective.) 
Even if objectivity is a reasonable goal to strive for, it will never be attainable in anything 
other than a strictly mathematical or logical argument. If we take the mathematical workings of 
an economic model to be indisputable, there is still the question of whether the model adequately 
represents a real-world situation, and what the implications of the model tell us about that real-
world situation. There can be disagreement about this at a number of levels, and the nature of 
disagreement may be difficult to assess given the possibility that values can intrude into a logical 
process. Then the important question, and the one worthy of attention in class, becomes to what 
extent disagreement is reasonable. 
To illustrate this point, I ask students: Is it reasonable to deny that the Holocaust actually 
occurred? Does the fact that there is not unanimous agreement mean that it is debatable? (One 
advantage of this question is that it gets their attention, but if one wishes to use a less 
emotionally fraught example, whether the moon landing was real can serve the same purpose.) 
Most students’ instinctive reaction will be no, but they may not be able to articulate a 
justification for this instinct. I then ask them to imagine how an academic historian might react to 
a Holocaust denier. Would the historian simply disagree, or “agree to disagree”? More likely, the 
historian would question the argument underlying the Holocaust denier’s claim. The historian 
could criticize the denier’s refusal to accept certain evidence, or the reasons for doing so (which 
may or may not have been stated openly), or the denier’s acceptance of dubious evidence, or 
perhaps the denier’s refusal to respond to criticism directly. Acceptance of the Holocaust as 
historical fact is not only a majority view, but is also supported by historians using rigorous and 
compelling arguments, and these historians respond to Holocaust denial in a reasonable and 
responsible way that Holocaust deniers tend not to reciprocate.2 Holocaust denial is, arguably, so 
difficult to support, so easy to criticize, that it does not deserve equal status with other historical 
views, or that one need not even take it seriously (and one can go on to criticize the feelings of 
injustice that arise as a reaction to this view). One cannot prove any historical fact in the same 
sense as proving that two plus two equals four, but acknowledging the impossibility of such 
proof is not the same as considering the question to be debatable in the sense that reasonable 
disagreement can exist. 
A less extreme example illustrates the point further. I briefly describe to students the 
Austrian school of thought, including that it is outside the mainstream of the economics 
profession. I note also that, in my experience, mainstream economists may have different 
attitudes toward non-mainstream ideas: One might view such ideas as topics for thoughtful 
debate, while another might dismiss them out of hand. To take a specific example, one economist 
might put Austrian monetary theory in the same category as Holocaust denial, in the sense of 
being untenable and beneath serious consideration. Another economist might disagree with 
Austrian monetary theory but still take it seriously. How do we decide whether disagreement is 
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reasonable? There is simply no objective way to answer that question. It is up to the individual to 
decide, recognizing that the presence of any kind of disagreement does not imply that any 
opinion or argument is as good as any other, or that every opinion or argument is valid. This is a 
crucial component of the critical thinking we hope to inculcate in undergraduates. 
I would say that, outside of a class in mathematics or logic, it is a mistake to try to appeal 
to objective truth. I never go so far as to claim that the Holocaust actually is historical fact, just 
that the opposing view is very hard to defend. There is much we can teach students about making 
and evaluating arguments, but to what extent different opinions are reasonable will generally be 
a subjective issue. Navigating that subjectivity is a burden that any intellectually responsible 
person must bear.3 
 
What is science? 
A more focused question that is related to the above issues is whether or to what extent 
economics can be considered a science. This question can generate responses and follow-up 
questions that make for a fruitful discussion. 
I start the discussion by putting the question directly to students: 
 
Is economics a science? 
Typically there will be both yes and no responses from students, and I find it useful to 
probe the latter first. Common justifications for denying that economics is a science are that it is 
somehow different from the natural sciences or that the complexity of social phenomena 
precludes any kind of precise analysis. It often takes some back-and-forth to get students to 
articulate these objections, which I see as a beneficial exercise in itself. The comparison and 
contrast with the natural sciences is a key component of the discussion and a good point to 
consider next: 
 
How is economics different from physics? How is it the same? 
The most obvious answer to the first question is that physics deals with physical rather 
than social phenomena; but some students will likely argue that the results obtained in physics 
are more reliable and less open to interpretation than those in economics. Again, nudging 
students into articulating this is part of the exercise. 
For the latter question, some students will want to say that economics and physics are not 
the same in any respect. This is a good time to come back to those students who originally 
supported the idea that economics is a science. Sometimes a student will cut straight to the use of 
the scientific method as the decisive criterion, or there may be mention of the components of the 
method: gathering of evidence through observation or experimentation as well as a process for 
interpreting the evidence. This provides an answer to the fundamental question, which until this 
point I will have avoided confronting directly: 
 
What is science? 
I note here that this would have been an appropriate question to address first, but that one 
often sees claims that economics is not a science without any consideration of how we define the 
term.  
                                                          
3 More discussion of whether and to what extent objectivity is achievable in economic arguments and their 
application can be found in Myrdal (1969), Putnam and Walsh (2011), and Clements (2019). 
21 |JOURNAL FOR ECONOMIC EDUCATORS, 19(1), 2019 
 
Now, if we can agree that the scientific method—the formulation and testing of 
hypotheses—can be applied both to physics and to economics, there is room for debate over 
what constitutes a test of a hypothesis, whether it necessarily involves gathering observable data 
or whether a theoretical argument can suffice. Also, we are left with the idea that economics 
somehow lacks the precision of physics and that this bears upon how much confidence we can 
have in the conclusions of economic analysis. 
It is important to acknowledge that the social sciences generally consider highly complex, 
nuanced phenomena, and that a greater degree of simplification is involved in reducing those 
phenomena to tractable models as compared to the natural sciences. This can be a basis for 
criticism of any given economic argument. 
This brings me to an alternative view of science for students to consider (which does not 
preclude use of the scientific method): that science is a system of rhetoric, a method of 
persuasion with its own style and norms.4 The view of science as a tool for persuasion dovetails 
with the idea of subjectivity. Whether or not one tries to make a claim of objective truth, the 
bottom line is often whether someone is convinced—which brings us back to the idea of making 
and evaluating arguments, and the possibility that one finds an argument simply unconvincing, 
or completely untenable. 
This, finally, brings me to the point that we need not consider whether economics is a 
science to be a yes-or-no question. We can consider the scientific approach to economic 
questions as one possibility (in contrast to an historical approach, for example) with its own 
strengths and weaknesses. It is difficult to argue that there is absolutely no insight to be gained 
by considering economic questions in a scientific manner; but certainly there are pitfalls in doing 
so, and there may be questions for which the scientific method is not well suited. (Here I refer 
back to students’ claims that economics is not a science, which could be classified as potential 
problems with the scientific approach to economics.) Alternative approaches may have different 
strengths and weaknesses, and one approach may be better than another with regard to a specific 
question. Framing the question as whether economics, by definition, is or is not a science 
precludes discussion of a much better set of questions: What does it mean to take a scientific 
approach to economic questions? What value is to be had by doing that? What problems may 
arise through this approach? What alternative approaches may also be valuable? 
When people argue over whether economics is a science, often they are really arguing 
about the strengths and weaknesses of economics as a science, and in what ways scientific 
economic arguments are or are not compelling. These are useful issues to come back to 
throughout the semester.  
 
What is economics?  
With all of this discussion of what is not a necessary part of economic reasoning, there 
can be some confusion over what economics fundamentally is. Students may respond that it has 
something to do with trade, or money, or supply and demand, and all of these have in common 
the one element that is essential to economics and defines it as a field: scarcity. Economic agents 
must decide how to allocate scarce resources, and these decisions have aggregate effects. I like to 
use students’ allocation of their own time as an example, notable in that it involves scarcity but 
no market or trade of any kind. 
Economics does not by its very nature involve any specific methodologies, just as it does 
not demand the adoption of any particular beliefs or assumptions. In teaching the mainstream, 
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scientific approach to economics (as I do), we need not claim that one must always do it this 
way, or that one can’t do it any other way. To do so would be as misleading as an economics 
instructor using historical methodology and claiming that no other way, including the scientific, 
is valid. If we’re talking about scarcity, we’re doing economics. 
As we work through the methodology, I frequently repeat Box’s (1976) comment, “All 
models are wrong, but some are useful.” Models are never themselves true but may help us to get 
at some underlying truth. The important questions are how useful a model is given its limitations, 
and how much it contributes to understanding a particular question. All of that is debatable, and 
something students must decide for themselves, while recognizing how fraught those decisions 
can be. We can teach them the mechanics of a model in an essentially objective sense, and to be 
thoughtful and thorough in making and evaluating arguments. But where they go with that is up 
to them. 
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